Jillian Ostrove
Law Review
December 17, 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1

II.

CALIFORNIA PAROLE REGULATIONS……………………………................2

III.

SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA………………………………………………………..4

IV.

CONTRARY PRECEDENT……………………………………………………...5
A.

Expectation of Privacy…………………………………………………….5

B.

Standard for Search and Seizure…………………………………………..6

V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE MAJORITY’S LOGIC IN THE SAMSON
DECISION…………………………………………...……………………………7

VI.

EFFECTS ON CALIFORNIA…………………………………………………...10

VII.

A.

A Blank Check for Police Misconduct…………………………………..10

B.

“Arbitrary, Capricious, or Harassing” Searches…………………………12
i.

An Allowance for Pretextual Stops……………………………...13

ii.

An Allowance for Racial Profiling………………………………14

ii.

Privacy Rights of Third Parties…………………………………..16

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..20
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Limitless Blank Check for “Arbitrary, Capricious, or Harassing” Searches and Seizures

I.

INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2004, nearly five million adults were under Federal, State, or local

probation or parole jurisdiction;1 nearly one quarter of those people were on parole.2 At
some point during their sentence, almost 95% of all state prisoners will be released, and
nearly 80% of those released will be placed on parole supervision.3 In California, in
order for an inmate to be released on parole, he must stipulate that the police can search
him at any time for any reason, and that any items found on his person can be
subsequently seized.4 However, this policy conflicts with the Fourth Amendment which
protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”5 In June 2006, the United States Supreme
Court handed down a decision which effectively eradicates this fundamental right for
parolees.6 Samson v. California7 affirmed a California Court of Appeals decision, quoting
Cal. Penal. Code § 3067(a), which states that "[e]very prisoner eligible for release on
state parole shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or
other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant, and
1

U. S. Department of Justice, Probation and Parole Statistics, http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pandp.htm
(September 22, 2006).
2
U. S. Department of Justice, Probation and Parole Statistics, http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pandp.htm
(September 22, 2006).
3
U. S. Department of Justice, Probation and Parole Statistics, http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pandp.htm
(September 22, 2006).
4
Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a) (2006).
5
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
6
See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. 2006).
7
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. 2006).
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with or without cause."8 The Supreme Court should have made the standard for parolee
searches and seizures one of “reasonable suspicion” which would have lowered the
expectation of privacy for parolees to the same level as that of probationers. Instead, by
adopting the “any reason” standard promulgated in Samson, the Court eliminated all
expectations of parolee privacy.
This article explores the dire effects that that this decision will have on every state
in the union, but in particular, California. Allowing such unfounded searches will open
the doors to limitless police harassment without consequence. If parolees, free from
prison and trying to make the transition back into society, cannot depend on the
fundamental freedoms given to all citizens through the United States Constitution, then
these parolees may be equally well off back behind bars, where they have the same
amount of rights that are afforded them on the outside under the Court’s “any reason”
search standard.

II.

CALIFORNIA PAROLE REGULATIONS
“[A] period of parole placed on an adult is intended ‘to provide for the

supervision of and the surveillance of parolees, . . . and to provide educational,
vocational, family and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition
between imprisonment and discharge.’”9 In California, an inmate may either serve his
parole period in prison, or out, but subject to certain conditions.10 While these conditions
may include mandatory drug testing, restrictions on association with others, and

8

Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a) (2006).
People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 462 (Cal. 1998) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 3000(a)(1)).
10
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (U.S. 2006).
9
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mandatory meetings with a parole officer,11 the parole conditions must also be
reasonable.12 Parolees must comply with every restriction and condition imposed,
including any special conditions deemed necessary by the parole board if unusual
circumstances exist.13 The extent of such impositions, “demonstrate that parolees have
severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”14
In the interest of justice,15 any inmate who is eligible for parole in California must
“agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or
without cause.”16 In addition to conflicting with the United States Constitution, this
penal code section stands in stark contrast to Article I, Section 13 of the California
Constitution.17 The California Constitution provides, in almost identical content and
structure to the Fourth Amendment,18 “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or

11

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (U.S. 2006).
Terhune v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 4th 864, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Conditions imposed on
parole must be reasonable, since parolees retain constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive
official action . . . .”).
13
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (U.S. 2006).
14
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (U.S. 2006).
15
See Cal. Penal Code §1202.7 (2006) (stating the California legislature’s intent concerning strict parole
provisions: “The Legislature finds and declares that the provision of probation services is an essential
element in the administration of criminal justice. The safety of the public, which shall be a primary goal
through the enforcement of court-ordered conditions of probation; the nature of the offense; the interests of
justice, including punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, and enforcement of
conditions of probation; the loss to the victim; and the needs of the defendant shall be the primary
considerations in the granting of probation.”).
16
Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a) (2006).
17
Cal. Const. art. I, § 13.
18
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
12
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affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to
be seized."19

III.

SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA
In June 2006, the United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 majority, handed down a

controversial and unprecedented decision in Samson v. California20 regarding parolee
privacy rights in connection with Cal. Penal Code §3067(a).21
On September 2, 2002, while Donald Curtis Samson was on parole for possession
of a firearm, he was stopped on the street by Officer Alex Rohleder of the San Bruno
Police Department.22 The officer knew that Samson was on parole, and believed he had
an outstanding warrant.23 After Rohleder radioed in Samson’s information and was
informed that there was no such warrant, Rohleder— being aware of Samson’s §3067(a)
search condition, and for no reason other than Samson’s status as a parolee— searched
Samson and found a small bag of methamphetamine in his shirt pocket.24 Samson was
subsequently charged with possession.25 The trial court denied Samson’s request to
suppress the evidence, finding that the search was reasonable because it was within the
scope of §3067(a) and was not “‘arbitrary or capricious.’”26 Both the California Court of
Appeal and the United States Supreme Court affirmed.27 Despite Samson’s contention

19

Cal. Const, Art. I § 13.
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. 2006).
21
Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a) (2006).
22
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
23
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
24
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
25
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
26
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
27
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
20
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that he was searched solely based on his parolee status, thereby violating his Fourth
Amendment right, the U.S. Supreme Court held that,
[T]he suspicionless search was a reasonable condition of parole which
advanced state interests and parole conditions severely diminished the
inmate's expectation of privacy while on parole. The State of California
had substantial legitimate interests in reducing recidivism and thereby
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship, and requiring
individualized suspicion to support the search of the inmate would
undermine those interests. Further, the constitutional requirement that the
search be reasonable did not preclude the suspicionless search, and the
inmate's limited privacy rights were protected by the prohibition of
searches which were arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.28

IV.

CONTRARY PRECEDENT
A.

Expectation of Privacy

In 1967, the United States Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, stated that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”29 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan extends this idea and asks just what that protection is.30 He sets forth a twofold
requirement regarding the relationship between protection and a citizen’s expectation of
that protection: 1) A person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and 2) That that expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
“‘reasonable.’”31 For example, a man’s home is, generally, a place where he expects
privacy; however, activities or statements that he exposes to the public in “plain view”32

28

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. 2006).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
30
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
31
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)
(holding that Defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the luggage he carried on a bus);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that Petitioner did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his home from a sense-enhancing, thermal imaging device, without which the information could
not have been obtained without “physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”).
32
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
29
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are not “protected”33 since he has not exhibited any intention of keeping such activities or
statements to himself.34 Similarly, a conversation that takes place in public would not be
protected, since an expectation of privacy in this circumstance would be unreasonable.35
In 1979, the Supreme Court further expanded Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz to its decision in Smith v. Maryland.36 In Smith, the Court stated that, “the
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking the
protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of
privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”37

B.

Standard for Search and Seizure

In addition to the reasonable expectation of privacy promulgated by the United
States Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment expresses the probable cause standard for
all searches and seizures.38
In spite of the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, in Terry v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court created a new, intermediate standard that deemed certain types of
searches reasonable, even when there was not “probable cause” for the search.39

33

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
(holding that under the twofold Katz test, the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
growing illegal substances in his backyard which were visible from “within public navigable airspace.”).
35
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
36
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
37
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
38
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
39
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34
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However, the Court only lowered the probable cause standard to this new, reasonable
suspicion standard for “stop and frisk” situations.40 The Terry Court held,
[t]hat where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.41
This language clearly demonstrates that the reasonable suspicion standard is only
acceptable when a police officer believes that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
person with whom the officer is dealing may be presently armed and dangerous.42 Only
after these two elements are satisfied is a police officer allowed to search a suspect.43
However, even though a “frisk” is the only type of search allowed under the reasonable
suspicion standard,44 a “frisk” is still a far cry from a search allowed under a probable
cause standard.

V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE MAJORITY’S LOGIC IN THE SAMSON DECISION
The majority’s justifications in Samson, which allows police officers to search

parolees at any time, strictly contradict the right of privacy and the probable cause
requirement, and even contradict the lesser reasonable suspicion standard. However, as

40

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
42
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
43
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
44
Bryan A. Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary, (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2d ed., West 2001), defines a “frisk” as,
“A pat-down search to discover a concealed weapon.”
41
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even the Court itself pointed out in Griffin v. Wisconsin,45 “a reduced need for review
does not justify a complete removal of the. . . requirement.”46
Throughout the Samson opinion, the Court sets forth little more than dubious
logic in an attempt to justify the difference between the rights of a parolee and those of a
probationer. While the Court concludes that "[p]arolees are on the continuum of stateimposed punishments. . . [and] on this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations of
privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is
to imprisonment,"47 throughout the twenty-five page opinion, the Court did not once
explain why. In fact, the Court ignored clearly relevant precedent. Despite an unfettered
statement that parolees can be searched at any time and without reason, an array of case
law asserts the exact opposite. For example, in People v. Reyes,48 the Supreme Court of
California stated that
[I]n most cases the life of a parolee more nearly resembles that of an
ordinary citizen than that of a prisoner. The parolee is not incarcerated; he
is not subjected to a prison regime, to the rigors of prison life and the
unavoidable company of sociopaths. . . . The parolee lives among people
who are free to come and go when and as they wish. Except for the
conditions of parole, he is one of them.49
Five years later in People v. Sanders, the Supreme Court of California again supported
this position by stating that although "[a] parolee's expectation of privacy certainly is
diminished, . . . it is not eliminated."50

45

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 886 (1987).
47
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2198 (U.S. 2006).
48
People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998).
49
People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 462 (Cal. 1998) (citing People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1260 (Cal.
1986), overruled on other grounds).
50
People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 332 (Cal. 2003); see also United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521
F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that “[a] probationer, like the parolee, has the right to enjoy a
significant degree of privacy.”); Moreno v. Baca, 400 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir.2005) (stating that there is
no “constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment.”); In Re
46
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In Samson, although the majority concludes that a parolee does not have any sort
of privacy expectation that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate, the Court
clearly contradicts itself. The Court states twelve times that a parolee, like a probationer,
does have an expectation of privacy, albeit, a diminished one, when compared to that of
any given free citizen.51 The six-justice majority even goes as far as to state that if
Samson did not implicate the Fourth Amendment then the case would have been resolved
through Hudson v. Palmer, which held that the prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures did not apply to prison cells.52
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledges another clear error in the
majority’s logic: “[t]hat prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are
like prisoners; therefore, parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy.”53 Because
parolees, like probationers, only enjoy “conditional liberty. . . dependent on observance
of special. . . restrictions,”54 the fact still remains that probationers (and parolees) “are
not in confinement.”55 As the dissent further points out, the majority, which concludes
that parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy, contradicts itself throughout the
opinion by stating that parolees are not in confinement.56 This begs the question, how
can a parolee be granted “conditional liberty” if at the same time he is given no more
liberty than a prisoner? Ultimately, the Court’s holding will have a substantial effect
upon California citizens, parolees and non-parolees alike.
Stevens, 119 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The expectation of privacy is the same
whether the search is a condition of probation or parole.”).
51
See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193-2196, 2198-2199, 2201 (U.S. 2006).
52
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy,
and that the prohibition on unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did
not apply to prison cells).
53
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2204-2205 (U.S. 2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 40 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
55
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 883 (1987).
56
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2204-2205 (U.S. 2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI.

EFFECTS ON CALIFORNIA
A.

A Blank Check for Police Misconduct

Writing for the Samson majority, Justice Thomas noted that California’s
suspicionless search system, which gives officers “unbridled discretion to conduct
searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that arouse strong resentment in parolees and
undermine their ability to reintegrate into productive society, is belied by California’s
prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious, or harassing’ searches.”57 However, the Court
should not have relied on California’s prohibition against arbitrary searches to substitute
for the Fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness. As demonstrated below, this
arbitrary search prohibition is an ineffective bulwark against police excesses. As stated in
United States v. Knights, since a parolee cannot be searched without some sort of
reasonable suspicion, it logically follows that the parolee cannot also be searched merely
because of his status as a parolee.58
In 1978, the California Court of Appeals held in People v. Natale,59 that, “where
there existed no probable cause for the police officer to search, the police could not
circumvent [the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution] by getting blanket approval
for searches by parole officers when those parole officers had no knowledge of the facts. .
. .”60 While this holding is still good law, upon closer inspection, the Samson opinion
essentially overrules this idea and provides for little more than a blank check for police
misconduct.
57

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (U.S. 2006).
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (U.S. 2001); see also United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868,
873 (9th Cir. 2002) (“affirmed the validity of a search pursuant to a probation term that authorized a
warrantless search at any time by any probation officer or law enforcement officer, as long as the search
was supported by reasonable suspicion.”) (emphasis added).
59
People v. Natale, 77 Cal. App. 3d 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
60
People v. Natale, 77 Cal. App. 3d 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
58
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In attempting to articulate and provide evidence for their conclusion, the majority
in Samson relied heavily on U.S. v. Knights.61 In Knights, the court found that
defendant's status as a probationer subjected him to a search condition (similar to
§3067(a)) because he had a diminished expectation of privacy.62 The Court further found
that when an officer had reasonable suspicion that a probationer was subject to a search
condition, and was engaged in criminal activity, there was enough likelihood that
criminal conduct was occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly
diminished privacy interests was reasonable.63 Finally, the Court concluded that the
warrantless search of defendant, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a
condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.64
While the Samson court tried to synonymize the facts before it with those of
Knights, the Court made one fatal flaw. In Knights, the officer had reasonable suspicion
to search the defendant’s apartment.65 The officer knew that the defendant had long been
the focus of an investigation regarding the vandalism and arson of an electrical plant in
Napa County.66 In Samson, however, Officer Rohleder had no reason to suspect Samson
of any crime, let alone stop Samson on the street; Samson was simply a parolee.67 Once
Officer Rohleder had been informed that Samson had no outstanding warrant, the officer
had no reason to believe that Samson was involved in any crime, or that any
incriminating evidence would be found on his person.68 A pretextual search based simply

61

See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (U.S. 2006).
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (U.S. 2001).
63
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (U.S. 2001) (emphasis added).
64
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (U.S. 2001) (emphasis added).
65
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (U.S. 2001).
66
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (U.S. 2001).
67
See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
68
See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (U.S. 2006).
62
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on status, such as the search that occurred in Samson, cannot be reconciled with a case in
which there was reasonable suspicion to search, as was the case in Knights.69
B.

“Arbitrary, Capricious, or Harassing” Searches
With no discretionary tools put in place, the scope of searches permitted under

Samson is relentless. In addition to Samson giving law enforcement excessive leeway to
search, the decision also permits such things as pretextual stops, racial profiling, and
violations of the privacy rights of third parties. It’s like Christmas for harassment.
The fact that a parolee no longer has a legitimate expectation of privacy, coupled
with the nonexistent reasonable suspicion search standard, ultimately renders the Samson
decision tantamount to the decision in Whren v. United States.70 In 1996, the Supreme
Court in Whren held that a law enforcement officer’s subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis.71 Because the Samson court held that there is no
standard needed to search a parolee, as long as the search is not arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing, all the officer needs to legitimize the search (to prove that it was not arbitrary,
capricious, or harassing) is a fabricated, objective72 rationale that satisfies the judge.73

69

See Part VI(B)(i).
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
71
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
72
See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (setting forth an objectivity test, stating that, “[t]he
fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify that action”).
73
See U.S. v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004). In Crawford, the searching officer (Bowdich)
testified that it is common practice for law enforcement officers to use “Fourth Waivers” as a “tool to talk”
to suspects about crimes. “Because the robbery had occurred more than two years earlier and because
Defendant had changed residences, Bowdich did not hope to find evidence of the Ulrich Street robbery
during the parole search. Rather, Bowdich intended to use the parole search as a pretext to speak to
Defendant about the . . . robbery. At most, Bowdich hoped to find evidence of a new crime or parole
violation, which he could use to convince Defendant to confess to the old crime. In Bowdich’s words, ‘we
weren’t looking for evidence of a bank robbery, but we were looking at potential of possibly flipping him,
if we were able to find evidence of a state case.’ The court made it clear, however, that it was not declaring
an unfettered open-season on parolees. In keeping with the principle that permissible degree of
impingement on a parolee’s privacy is ‘not unlimited;’” see also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248
70
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Now, despite an officer’s subjective intent for searching a parolee, a court will uphold
such a search, even if it “was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to
[the parolee’s] privacy or even physical interests.”74 Under Samson, an officer is now
permitted to subjectively search, objectively lie, and ultimately abuse the parolee search
process.
i.

An Allowance for Pretextual Stops

In U.S. v. Cannon,75 the Ninth Circuit held that,
[A] pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make
the stop in order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for
an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a stop.76
Under Cannon, a pretextual stop (and search) occurs when there is no reasonable
suspicion for the stop. The Court’s definition of a pretextual stop mirrors the nonexistent
reasonable suspicion standard needed under Samson; therefore, searches conducted
without reasonable suspicion are pretextual.77 Further, Cannon’s definition of a pretextual
stop not only implies a degree of harassment, but is ultimately tantamount to actual
harassment. Therefore, if a standardless search is pretextual, and if a pretextual search is
arbitrary, capricious, or harassing, then the only logical conclusion is that standardless
searches are inherently arbitrary, capricious or harassing.
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that “the powers granted to police are powerful, and subject to
potential abuse”).
74
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
75
U.S. v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1994).
76
U.S. v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
(affirming a motion to suppress marijuana found in defendant’s car when the police officer stopped the
defendant’s vehicle after neither observing any traffic or equipment violations, nor any suspicious activity);
People v. Cervantes, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1404 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s stop by the
officer was illegal in that there was no reasonable suspicion to support it, and that it constituted an
“arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” search).
77
This is true even despite the fact that there is an underlying public policy reason for the Supreme Court in
Samson holding that a suspicionless search of a parolee is legal. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,
2200 (U.S. 2006). Blacks Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004), defines “pretext” as
“A false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.”
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This idea is one of the many fears expressed by the dissent in Samson.78 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, stated that, “if
individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it must be replaced with measures to protect
against the state actor’s unfettered discretion.”79 Not only has the majority rejected the
idea of individualized suspicion, but the majority has also failed to replace such suspicion
with anything to protect a parolee against an officer’s “unfettered discretion.” As such,
we are now living in a world governed by the overreaching holding of Samson, which
states that searches which are arbitrary, capricious, or harassing, are unlawful, are nothing
more than a mere “form of words,”80 one in which, as explained above, can be easily
circumvented.
ii.

An Allowance for Racial Profiling

In addition to permitting pretextual stops, Samson leaves open the door for racial
profiling. Because an officer can stop and search a parolee based on nothing more than
his status, an officer can now stop a parolee because he is, for example, a minority, doing
so under the guise of hoping to find some incriminating evidence to put the parolee back
behind bars.
In California, where nearly 40%81 of the state’s citizens, and 59%82 of the state’s
parolees are either African American or Hispanic, Samson could potentially have
devastating effects. For example, in an age where terrorism is a major political and social
concern, the chances of a Middle Eastern parolee being searched would seem to be higher
78

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2207 (U.S. 2006).
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2204 (U.S. 2006).
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Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&geo_id=04000US06&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&redoLog=false (October 25, 2006).
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U. S. Department of Justice, Probation and Parole Statistics, http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pandp.htm
(October 25, 2006).
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than the chances of a parolee of a different race being searched (regardless of whether or
not that parolee was in prison five years ago during the September 11, 2001 attacks). An
officer can now stop a Middle Eastern parolee without any suspicion that the parolee is
currently involved in any crime, and search that parolee in the extremely slight hope that
the officer could find some evidence on the parolee that could tie the parolee to a possible
terrorist attack. Such a search would be completely arbitrary, pretextual, and racist, yet
under Samson that search would also be completely, and objectively, permissible.
African Americans have the highest recidivism rates once on parole.83 Does this
mean that just because one of the objectives of Samson is to cut down on the recidivism
rate in California,84 that every parolee who happens to be African American has drugs on
their person, or is hiding a weapon in their house? Absolutely not. However, a police
officer can now search an African American parolee from head to toe, and search that
parolee’s personal belongings inside and out, simply because the searching officer does
not like the parolee’s ethnicity. The effects of such a coincidence only add to the amount
of harassment that is perfectly allowable.
Moreover, when illegal immigration and border patrol are key issues in upcoming
elections, a parole officer can easily search a parolee in hopes of finding some secondary
information, such as an immigration violation, on a parolee who is not yet an American
citizen.85 A California citizen, who is also a minority, already has significant hardships
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2207 (U.S. 2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The State’s interest in lowering its recidivism rates have “never
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when it comes to living a normal, everyday life, let alone when that citizen is a parolee,
trying to rebuild society’s trust. This adversity is infinitely magnified, as an officer can
now arbitrarily search a parolee for any reason— or no reason at all. Now, under
Samson, a parolee, who, despite his ethnicity, has already repaid his debt to society by
serving time behind bars, is now faced with a situation in which even outside the prison
walls, his constitutional rights, and right to privacy, are virtually nonexistent.86
iii.

Privacy Rights of Third Parties

Samson also raises the issue of privacy rights of third parties. Although a warrant
is generally required to search or arrest an individual either in his own home, or in the
home of another, the warrant requirement is not the same for parolees as it is for regular
citizens.87 As a condition of their parole, an officer may search a parolee’s home or
person at any time, with or without cause.88 This also applies when the parolee shares a
residence with another person, whether a wife, a roommate, or a family member.
However, even when it comes to searching a parolee’s residence, especially one that is
shared, the reasonable suspicion requirement has always been used.
Defendant had changed residences, Bowdich did not hope to find evidence of the Ulrich Street robbery
during the parole search. Rather, Bowdich intended to use the parole search as a pretext to speak to
Defendant about the. . . robbery. At most, Bowdich hoped to find evidence of a new crime or parole
violation, which he could use to convince Defendant to confess to the old crime. In Bowdich’s words, ‘we
weren’t looking for evidence of a bank robbery, but we were looking at potential of possibly flipping him,
if we were able to find evidence of a state case.’ The court made it clear, however, that it was not declaring
an unfettered open-season on parolees. In keeping with the principle that permissible degree of
impingement on a parolee’s privacy is ‘not unlimited;’” see also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that “the powers granted to police are powerful, and subject to
potential abuse).
86
See U.S. v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that “who is in fact stopped could depend
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unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
87
See Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204 (1981)(holding that the “petitioner's U.S. Const. amend. IV rights
were violated when drug enforcement officers, in the absence of consent and exigent circumstances,
entered petitioner's home and searched for the subject of an arrest warrant without first obtaining a search
warrant.”); Payton v, N.Y., 445 U.S. 573 (1980)(holding that “The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.”).
88
Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a)(2006).
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In 1987, Justice Blackmun stated in his dissenting opinion in Griffin v. Wisconsin,
that “[a]t the very core (of the Fourth Amendment) stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”89
Traditionally, courts have shown the utmost respect for the privacy of a person’s home—
even a probationer’s home; thus, the standard for searching a parolee’s residence has
always been heightened, at least when compared to the standard for searching a parolee’s
person.90
Because a person’s home is “the place that traditionally has been regarded as the
center of a person’s private life, the bastion in which one has a legitimate expectation of
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment,”91 “[t]he right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom . . . .”92 As such, “any search
of a probationer’s [or parolee’s] home . . . satisfies the Fourth Amendment as long as the
information possessed by the officer satisfies a. . . ‘reasonable grounds’ standard.”93
Further,
[t]he parolee and his home must be subject to search by the parole officer
when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the
performance of his duties. His decision may be based upon specific facts,
though they are less than sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause.
It may even be based on a hunch, arising from what he has learned or
observed about the behavior and attitude of the parolee. To grant such
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(emphasis added).
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powers to the parole officer is not unreasonable under U.S. Const. amend.
IV.94
This is where the problem arises. Although precedent has taught us that a reasonable
suspicion standard is necessary to search a parolee’s residence, Samson obliterates this
precedent, leaving some questions regarding third party privacy unanswered. For
example, if the parolee lives in a house with others, can the other housemates’ rooms be
searched? What if the parolee is just stopping by a friend’s house for a brief visit? To
drop something off? For an afternoon barbeque? Even if these searches are allowed,
when would the search become harassment? For example, can a peace officer follow the
parolee around and search every building that he goes in to? These are the crucial
questions that must be answered in order to decipher the boundaries of the Samson
holding.
Post Samson, not only can an officer search a parolee’s house without cause, but
parts of the residence that are not within the parolee’s exclusive control can also be
searched, and as long as the reason for the search is objectively reasonable, any evidence
found can be used either against the parolee or against another person in the residence.95
For instance, if a searching officer has a reasonable ground to search the residence, if the
officer finds some incriminating evidence, such as drugs that belong to the parolee’s
roommate, such evidence can be used against the roommate, even though that is not the
reason that officers were searching the residence in the first place.96 Thus, Samson
extends the use of pretextual searches to search a parolee’s person, to the search of a
94

Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (1975).
See People v. Icenogle, 71 Cal. App. 3d 576 (1977) (upholding a conviction of a parolee’s girlfriend
when incriminating evidence was found in their joint residence, although the girlfriend was not on parole,
no search warrant was used, and the officers were there to only search the parolee’s property.).
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See People v. Icenogle, 71 Cal. App. 3d 576 (1977) (upholding a conviction of a parolee’s girlfriend
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no search warrant was used, and the officers were there to only search the parolee’s property.).
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parolee’s residence. Using an objectively justifiable reason, an officer can enter the
private domain of a parolee and use the parolee’s status as a pretext to search the home in
hopes of finding evidence against another.97
The long-prevailing reasonable suspicion standard was thought to safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy.98 Now, however, the
search possibilities open to law enforcement are absolutely infinite. Samson has opened
the floodgates to police misconduct; police are now given broad, sweeping power to
conduct parolee searches. It seems as though the Fourth Amendment as well as the
California Constitution should be changed to state, “the right of the people [except
parolees and their families] to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”99 Because parolees
(and now parolees’ housemates) do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that, at
least according to the Court, society is prepared to recognize as legitimate, there is no end
in sight to the arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches that have now become a
reality.100
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VII.

CONCLUSION
For over forty years, the California Supreme Court has followed the precedent set

forth in People v. Edgar101 that,
[b]oth the United States Constitution and the California Constitution make
it emphatically clear that important as efficient law enforcement may be, it
is more important that the right of privacy guaranteed by these
constitutional provisions be respected. Since in no case shall the right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures be
violated, the contention that unreasonable searches and seizures are
justified by the necessity of bringing criminals to justice cannot be
accepted. It was rejected when the constitutional provisions were adopted
and the choice was made that all the people, guilty and innocent alike,
should be secure from unreasonable police intrusions, even though some
criminals should escape.102
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Samson disregarded years of precedent to
erroneously and unfoundedly conclude that Samson, a parolee, has rights synonymous to
those of a prisoner behind bars. Now, parolees have any expectation of privacy that
society is, as the Court puts it, prepared to recognize as legitimate. However, if the Court
expects parolees to reintegrate themselves into society, they “should not be treated like . .
. prisoner[s] . . . ‘It is high time that we recognized that a person must have the freedom
to be responsible if he is to become responsibly free.’”103

with whom he resides.’ ‘However, our holding that particularized suspicion is not required in order to
conduct a search based on a properly imposed search condition does not mean parolees have no protection.
As explained in People v. Clower, ‘a parole search could become constitutionally 'unreasonable' if made
too often, or at an unreasonable hour, or if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing
arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer;’ See also In re Anthony S. (holding that a search is
arbitrary and capricious when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or
legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the
parolee); People v. Bremmer (unrestricted search of a probationer or parolee by law enforcement officers at
their whim or caprice is a form of harassment.).”
101
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102
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103
Sunny A.M. Koshy, Note: The Right of [All] the People to Be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth
Amendment Rights to Probationers and Parolees. 39 Hastings L.J. 449, 482 (1988).
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